

Reapportionment and Coalition Outlooks for the 1980's

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Session 2.

Redistricting and Coalitions: What the Data Show

MR. WEYRICH: We now continue our program on coalitions with a look at how realignment is shaping up and what reapportionment is doing with respect to party realignment. And for that presentation we are privileged to have a gentleman who in my opinion had the best record of any pollster in 1980. Lance Tarrance of Houston had the best record of accuracy in virtually every race in which he was involved.

As you probably know, he has been in the survey research business for quite some time. He used to be an associate of Decision-Making Information [DMI] and in 1978 started his own firm out of Houston. He was director of research for the Texas Republican Party, worked in the Census Bureau for some time, and has also authored a book, called *The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in American Politics*. He is now working on another book. Let's welcome Lance Tarrance of Houston, Texas.

[Applause]

MR. TARRANCE: Although very appreciative of the nice introduction by Paul, we have a saying in our business that you're only as good as your last survey. So, you tend not to read track records as much as you do on, so to speak, the coalition of the moment.

I'm always amused by people who talk about party coalitions, value coalitions, et cetera, covering 1820 to 1970. They tend to make me uneasy, because historians tend to view coalitions in a much more—not only a postdated way, but a mechanistic way, which doesn't really seem to bear upon our current problem.

The second way of looking at coalitions, by definition, tends to be on the other end of the extreme, philosophic. That is, what we want to happen, rather than what may or may not happen.

I tend to trend a little bit more toward political realism, not history, not philosophy, but toward what I want to loosely determine or define today as political engineering. That is, if you've asked me to construct a building, I am not the architect, who tends to be more philosophic. I am not the historian, who tends to want to look at the community at large and see what the building should or should not be congruent with, but I'm an engineer. And I'm going to talk to you today fairly straight, hopefully realistic, and a little bit of what I think is the art of the possible in what has to be built or cannot be built.

With that as a background, let me talk a little bit about the current word in

our political system, called "realignment." I will come back to this a little bit more—in a more definitive way in a minute.

Realignment doesn't occur cataclysmically very often. We tend to think that realignment occurred with a great detonator effect in the 1930s, but actually the precursors to realignment had been there for several presidential elections. And it did take historians—and we give them a lot of credit for that—to go back and pick up those precursors and find out that the trend was a durable trend, but long before 1936.

But in this regard, there are three ways, technically, as a political scientist, that you can realign an electorate. And before I get into that, let me just say this, that realignment is a very emotional act of behavior. And as I've said, somewhat facetiously, how many Catholics have become Baptists and how many Baptists have become Catholics? It's not an easy process to go through, because you have all these attendant facts about what makes a person a Republican or a Democrat or a nonaligned person, and you have all the antecedents that went into that, class, family, environment, et cetera, various long-term, deep-rooted kinds of behavior patterns generally that we go through in life.

The three types of realignment generally have to do with conversion. And conversion, as I suggest, is very, very difficult to occur over a short period of time. And even if you did allow a competing message to cause someone to convert, or to think about conversion, we know, from cross-pressure theory, that about half of the people that are under study, so to speak, for conversion tend to misperceive the message and cannot believe that that message is so strong that they should convert from Catholic to Baptist, et cetera.

The second type of realignment has to do with what we call inter-generational mobility, fancy words meaning sons and daughters of, for example, Democrats becoming independent, and not replacing another Democrat. So you see changes in the party realignment, but it's through the subtlety of nonreplacement or independent in place of Democrat.

The third type of realignment tends to be what we call mobilization of new voters. Whether it's the 18-year-old vote, whether it's the women's vote, et cetera, you mobilize new votes that have moved into a region, for example, which is occurring in this country with great speed, and you mobilize that new group into a new coalition. And that has been more or less what we've been seeing, in my opinion, in the last few years as mobilization of new voters as they cross state boundary lines.

Now, in this kind of discussion, when I start talking about state boundary lines being crossed, you have to automatically think about reapportionment. And I remember when I worked at the Census Bureau, people used to match and merge the comments of realignment—of reapportionment and redistricting, almost as if they were the same thing.

And in this reapportionment, finally, for the first time, the 1980 census will probably go down in history as the large census that really detonated, you might say, the Sun Belt phenomenon.

Each census has had its own sort of classifications, blacks moving to the Northeast and the Midwest during perhaps the 1940 census, the 1950 census showing a certain shift to the suburbs, and so forth and so on. So the 1980 census becomes, in effect, a Sun Belt census, if you will.

In that Sun Belt census of 1980, we found, in our terms, a fairly massive shift. Most of you are aware of the numbers. I believe it's 17 U.S. House seats, seats shifted largely from the so-called axis between Chicago, New York, and Boston, more or less, to an axis that's more closely identified with Houston, Los Angeles, Orlando, et cetera.

Now, 17 shifts really is a net 34 seats, and some have even facetiously commented that's one reason that Teddy Kennedy decided to make a run for it, among many others, in 1980, because he knew what was going to happen to the Electoral College by 1984.

The 1982 mid-term elections may show a slight Republican trend, nothing, in my opinion, yet to be classified as an overturn of the control of the U.S. House, but certainly some increase in the Republican Party. And we may determine that that's because of Reagan's programs; but a lot of it watch out for, because a lot of it will be the subtleties of demographic shifts, not necessarily partisan switches, per se.

Now, in this so-called realigning electorate by state—and I underscore the word "by state" very heavily—you have a new axis of power, as I determine it, that really runs from basically Orange County, California, to Orange County, Florida. As humorous as those two anchors may be for this access, it's true. Houston, Dallas, et cetera, may be on the fulcrum of that axis, but that axis is going to be very strong as long as energy is a scarce resource, and as long as the population continues to like sun rather than rain and sleet, and as long as the so-called free enterprise type of environment—anything goes, can-do attitude—is more prevalent, and the problems are not superimposed over the advantages, even though we know some of the trends in the Sun Belt already are showing that people are saying that maybe the population boom ought to slow down, maybe some of the disadvantages are outweighing the advantages.

So, we see a slight attitudinal shift, just in the last three or four years. But by and large, that axis of power is going to be very, very strong, particularly if energy resources become financial resources.

But the point is, as long as the Sun Belt is vibrant, you're going to have a very realigning electorate by state that will function, I think, a lot along the Sun Belt axis.

The Democratic Party is very strong, still, obviously, along the Northeast corridor. And one of the things that I think has happened to the Democratic Party, outside of perhaps some failed programs, some failed leadership groups, et cetera, is that their demographics, their market—if you want to be very, very straight about marketability of a party, based upon market shares, as they call it, market research—the marketplace for the Democrats has been declining and is centralized between Washington, Baltimore, New York, and Boston.

Most of the philosophic engine is driven by Boston. Most of the proving grounds are driven in New York City. And most of the policy implementation is driven in the D.C. area.

But the point is that the Democratic Party is zigging when it should be zagging, so to speak, in terms of the population shift vis-a-vis their own party strength.

There are two other axes of power that seem to be more or less determined by the 1980 census. And they'll have a lot to do with some of the shifting —switch-voting that will go along in future presidential elections. And they are relatively minor axes of power, but they tend to be the so-called critical few that make up a coalition that is put together on 51, 53, whatever, percentage of the vote. And that has to do with basically an up-scale type of axis that goes from roughly Des Moines, Chicago suburbs, Cincinnati, very white collar, very ticket-splitting, up-scale type of geopolitical axis that will have a lot to do with how elections will be determined, particularly along the Republican Party lines.

The other axis which showed some tremendous movement in the last election has to do with a more or less blue collar axis that's a Milwaukee, Detroit, Cleveland type of axis of power. And both parties will court that in terms of breaking the Democratic hold, as Reagan tried to do last time, or reinforcing the Democratic hold, as the Democrats will do next time.

So, those tend to be, in my estimation the major axes—even though there are many other minor axes of power. You're going to see geopolitics, "geopolitics" simply meaning the politics of regions coming to the forefront. And coalitions, in my opinion, will be based upon some of these structural demographic bloc of votes built around states that will band together based on their economic interest and some of their leadership cohesion.

And also keep in mind that this so-called vibrant, new part of the country has already featured the Clements election, the first time a Republican was elected governor in 100 years in Texas, or Treen in Louisiana, Cochran in Mississippi—and you could go on and on—at the breakthroughs in this part of the country for at least an emerging two-party system. It's still probably closer to a one-and-one-half party system. But when I was growing up in Texas in the 1960s, it was certainly a one-party system. So there has been movement in that respect.

So, the first sort of conclusion from these introductory remarks has to do with a phrase that could be called "away from the Northeast corridor," in terms of party coalitions, party power politics.

The second point I'd like to bring up today has to do with parties. If there indeed were a strong Republican movement, then we could say that we're indeed trending toward a party coalition that will feature the Republican Party as a building block rather than the Democratic Party, in terms of ticket-splitters.

But my conclusion is we're still in a trend "away from parties." The 1952 to 1982 trends need to be footnoted.

Most of the discussion we've had on the rebirth of the Republican Party

—and I'm always amused that every time Republicans win, most of the discussion has been heretofore on what the Democrats did to lose a temporary advantage, but when the Republicans lose, you simply talk about the extinction of the Republican Party. So this is the first time in history that you've seen the discussion move at least one dimension higher, and that is: Do the Republicans have a majority on the way?

We're a long way from extinction and a long way from simply the Democrats temporarily out of power—the so-called Warren Miller thesis of an election that was not a realigning election, but was a deviating election, as we've seen so much in the literature. It doesn't look like 1980 was deviating, or we wouldn't be talking about Republican majorities and partisanship.

I've studied the partisanship. Obviously, the ticket-splitter book that I co-authored had a lot to do with "how I perceive myself as a Democrat, Republican, or what," rather than how people actually vote in the voting booth. And we found a much greater explanation for some of the volatility of the elections in the late '60s through looking at vote behavior rather than self-perception.

But even agreeing to that difference, take a look at this partisanship based upon self-I.D. The strong Democrats—if you looked at the entire years of the '50s, going back to University of Michigan data, strong Democrats averaged about 22 percent, weak Democrats about 24 percent, Republicans about 14 and 14, between strong and weak Republicans. And that's during the '50s.

Now, let's take a look at the most recent measurements that we've seen, both private as well as public. Republicans are 14 and 13, strong to weak Republicans. So you cannot say, by definition, that the Republican self-I.D. has moved tremendously into a majoritarian potential.

The Democrats have shown weaknesses, 15 and 19 respectively between strong Democrats—that is, in the Deep South, we may call "brass collar" or "yellow dog" Democrats—and weak Democrats. But the point is they're still hovering around 35 percent, but they've dropped about 10 points in terms of strong Democratic partisanship.

So, if it hasn't gone to the Republican Party, where has it gone? Well, if you take a look at the independent vote, 21 percent were the independents, self-identified—"I'm not a Republican, I'm not a Democrat"—in the 1950s; 25 percent in the decade of the 1960s; 36 percent in the decade of the 1970s; and we're hovering around 39 percent, based on all recent measurements of self-identified independents.

So, the point of all this is that the Republican coalition has held pretty constant over the last 30 years, roughly. The independents are the ones that have picked up most of the slack, and the Democrats have gone down.

I might say that the independent who says he leans closer to the Republican Party than the Democratic Party is the source of the news of the last six months about the so-called resurgence of the Republican Party. Now, watch that, because from a methodological standpoint, whether it's Gallup, whether it's Harris, whether it's Roper, whether it's DMI, whether it's MOR [Market Opinion Research], it doesn't make any difference, they tend to collapse the in

dependent that leans Republican in with the Republicans. And that's where the movement has been. Those people tend to be relatively fickle. They're based upon a so-called cultural statement of how they view politics. And a cultural statement is that the Democrats are down, Republicans are up, it's probably a little bit more class-oriented, so to speak, social-class-oriented, to be a Republican right now. But they'll move away as fast as the Reagan programs—if they detonate, they'll be back over on the independent side, leaning Democratic. So, we cannot foster a prevailing view that somehow the Republicans, in my opinion, at least in the short run, have got a majoritarian viewpoint toward partisanship.

Now—in fact, I want to quote you from an interesting article by Representative Charles B. Rangel of New York, "Our common thread today is that we're losers. In the past, we've never had to get along. We've been able to get by by just tolerating each other. Now we've reached the point we have to find out what we do agree on, and we have to find out how to handle the issues where we don't agree on as Democrats," so says the reporter, "that the Democrats who grasp that basic point may be the key to survival, if not success, for more than just their strategy council meetings."

The point of all this, the Democrats are down. They're down organizationally. They're down even in some self-esteem; they believe Republicans have the powerful computers, they don't. But we're in a kind of age where the Democrats are going to be regrouping for a number of years. Republicans are at their peak at the moment, organizationally.

And this has a lot to do with some of the variations we see in partisanship in terms of Gallup, Harris kind of measurements. But don't buy it as a deep, durable, deeply-rooted trend until we take a long view of the independent who leans to Republican who becomes a self-identified Republican. [At the moment], we're still talking about independents, ticket-splitting, coalitions of the moment, topical kinds of coalitions that really will not be durable in the long run.

But a third thing I want to talk about today is the move away from a centralized voice. And by definition, the more pluralism we have in our American system, the less we are going to be able to put together a party coalition that has durable long-term roots.

What I mean by this is that the White House is largely being relegated, right or wrong, to a salesman type of approach. But the policy setters, pragmatic as they may be today, will continue to reside in the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House will continue to be very fractionated and look more or less like the New York Stock Exchange on a day of heavy trading.

[Laughter]

You'll see those three structures do not coalesce very easily by definition, if you assume the definition that I have, whether it's policy setters, whether it's salesmanship, or whether it's a New York Stock Exchange kind of metaphor.

What's going to happen is we're going to see more and more a move away

from any kind of a quick coalescence because the structures are not going to be architecturally or engineeringly built that way. But you're going to see more and more of this so-called three-party government, conservative Democrats, national Democrats, and Republicans. And Republicans can be treated as one group as long as there's not another Nelson Rockefeller in the wings that can create a two-party Republican Party. And since Rockefeller passed away, the liberals have had a very tough time working within the Republican Party and are basically turning toward moderation, you might say, rather than liberalism.

So, you can treat the Republican Party as fairly unified and the Democratic Party fairly ununified in terms of its two major components. But any time you have more than a two-person game, in probability theory, you're working around a three-person game, you're going to see more and more coalitions.

But the proving grounds, somewhat like automobile proving grounds, are going to be in the statehouses and the governorships. No longer are we going to be seeing that the statehouses are simply administrative arms of the Federal Government.

As Daniel Elazar says quite eloquently, we're going to see political entities—political separate entities beginning to become the proving grounds for the federalistic system. And if Reagan does capture that at the right moment and is able to transfer authority correctly, you will see statehouses being where most of the political future—whether we become a Republican majority, a Democratic majority—will be coming from.

People tend to see as the strongest advocate of a party not a senator, not a congressman, not a state party chairman, and not a political philosopher, but a state governor. And when state governors can become proving grounds and we can move a party in a certain way within a state and over a period of time enough states coalesce within the so-called geopolitical regions I talked about earlier, then you may see some true partisanship change in this country. But that takes a long, long time to effectuate.

So, we are going to see more dealignment talk rather than realignment talk, particularly as Reagan moves up and down. And as Reagan moves up, independents that lean closer to the Republican Party move up. And as Reagan moves down, independents that lean closer to a party maybe go to the middle ground.

Also keep in mind that, in my opinion, because of these structural pluralistic kinds of areas, (meaning the way Congress, both Senate and House, and governorships are structurally separate in many ways because of the attitude of voters to be more independent and because of no true realignment, more dealignment), you're going to have more and more what we call issue coalitions in my opinion.

"Issue coalitions," by definition, are coalitions of the moment. They're not durable. They may be durable if they're interconnected over many, many presidential elections, you might say. But we're going to see, for the short term—and the short term in political history means the next two or three decades, in my opinion—issue coalitions that will far precede any other type of coalition.

And to make my point, I don't believe there's ever been, in terms of sequential history, coalitions that started out as party coalitions.

There is a book out I just happened to see the other day by Seymour Lipset called *Party Coalitions*. I reject the very title of that book. I don't believe there can possibly be a party coalition at this particular moment in history. You will find issue coalitions that will precede the various other kinds of coalitions.

And generally, from a structural engineering standpoint, you take issue coalitions around at the moment. Who could be against budget-cutting, when the American people for 20 years have talked about cutting the government down to size, limiting spending, and making the connection to inflation? And for the first time, in 1980, inflation was simply more powerful than unemployment concerns.

So, there's nothing surprising to see the inflation in that kind of discussion being built around the so-called conservative Democratic Boll Weevils and Republicans.

You also see that the next coalitions will be more and more difficult when we get into things that are not up in the 75 percent majority viewpoints by the American voter. We're going to see next, after issue coalitions that are around for several election cycles, you may get a permanent – semi-permanent kind of political coalition. It may be that conservative Democrats and Republicans can be predictably counted on to vote a certain way on certain issues, but we don't have enough data to actually prove that.

But first is an issue coalition. Second is a political coalition – of the moment. Now, keep in mind, these are nondurable goods if you're an economist. These are coalitions of the moment, built around issues, and some political semi-durable kinds of alliances.

Only when you get into the demographic coalitions, black-white, upper class-lower class, union-nonunion, when you really can fashion a coalition built around demographics – that is, population characteristics which band together across states – will you finally be able to talk about true party coalitions, because what are parties? They are basically demographic groups that are aligned in one direction or the other. And only the fourth state of mind will be party coalitions. So, we're many, many years away, in my opinion, from truly talking about party coalitions.

The conclusion from all this is that you're going to have issue to issue coalitions that will probably be with us for the next 10, 15 years, in my opinion, because demographics – even though Houston is a great boom town in terms of population, not everybody is increasing as fast as Houston – take time. People have to die out of the political system; new people have to come into it. People convert slowly. People watch their presidential personalities as cue-givers to whether they're really comfortable with this party or that party. It takes a long – almost a generational pull to see permanent realignment.

So, in that respect, you have to assume that issues will precede all demographic and eventual party coalitions.

The second and final conclusion is you're going to see more pluralism – more

pluralism and less cohesion. But you're going to see more pluralism, more people getting into the act, more people having part of the action, all other types of phrases. And if that is true, then there's no way you can dominate with a majoritarian viewpoint based upon two or three people's view.

This might have occurred in some of the Boston wards, where you could get three or four people together in the old days, 40, 50 years ago, and fashion a fairly permanent coalition, because you could control the political system. But we all know that the New Haven study which came out in the '60s [Robert Dahl's *Who Governs?*], that very fine political science study, showed that actually politics in America was very, very pluralistic.

We also know from a participatory standpoint that there's a lot more participation going on in America than just simply federal elections and that we're going to see more pluralism, less cohesion.

And until all this settles out, there is no way in my opinion to bring forth any kind of permanent party coalition.

And with that I rest, and I'll take some questions.

[Applause]

QUESTION: Do you have evidence in your polling that people who move from Indiana or Michigan and go to Texas change their voting registration, and that the population shifting around may intensify people shifting parties quicker than you have suggested?

MR. TARRANCE: Well, no. We went back and studied the Paul Eggers vote [for governor] in 1970 and the Clements vote in 1978. And basically, the actual vote didn't really change that much if you control for who moved into the state since 1970. And the people that moved into Texas over that eight-year period were disproportionately Republican as they moved in. Now, we know these are the classical Shell middle-management executives moving from New York and voting Republican.

And Clements, having a national style to him, it didn't hurt him at all. They thought it was a liability, but it turned out it was perfect for that kind of new person who was moving in.

But realigning the state parties – that is, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi – that's where your realignment is occurring, from mobilization, not conversion.

Now, a lot of these people are moving in. I grew up in North Dallas originally, and a very strong business community moved in to North Dallas as I was growing up, most of it very, very Jewish, sort of built around, you might say, the marketing trade, textile trade, Neiman Marcus. And a lot of people thought that since a lot of these were coming – the Jewish population was coming in from the Northeast, that they would carry with them very liberal attitudes, very Democratic attitudes, and it didn't turn out to be that way. They socialized into the general pro-free enterprise or pro-conservative type of environment, and it did not change politics very much.

On the other hand, these Republicans that are moving in tend to be rather activist because they're mostly corporate.

Now, there's some discussion about people from the city of Flint, Michigan, moving into Houston. And all you've got to do is look around those Michigan tags, and you'll see how many people are trying to become Houstonians. A lot of these people are looking for quick-fix job situations that will fix up, repair, and then they'll go back to their cousins, aunts, and uncles. A lot also are not voters. They were alienated to start with, and they'll be more alienated unless they can get the kind of job, wages, et cetera, that they want.

So you tend to see right now the impact of interstate migration being more upscale, middle management, corporate, that tends to be more Republican, or business attitude. And that has had a great effect on some of these states.

The people that moved into Texas make up one out of five people that have moved in just in the last decade, one out of five voters. And of that one out of five, almost half are Republican identifiers — not even vote behavior, but identifiers, which is a more basic level. And the Democrats are about 15 points less than that. So that net exchange value is having a very important impact upon the Texas electorate.

QUESTION: You referred to issue coalitions. In the two-party system, how do you associate issue coalitions with the electorate?

I mean, the issues are normally decided by people who are in a position to act upon them.

MR. TARRANCE: I should footnote, when I say "issue coalitions," I mean in terms of the legislative behavior on spending, the tax cuts, et cetera. You're going to see more coalitions like that, but I don't see single issues or issue-voting in the electorate per se winning or losing in terms of the actual elections.

You vote for a Republican or a Democrat. Only about 25 percent of the people legitimately vote along issue lines, as best we can measure. The rest of the people are voting on personality, partisanship, region. So you won't have any big issue-voting down at the so-called microlevel of an individual voting.

You will see some loosely defined coalitions based on region. You'll find people voting more or less, unfortunately, Sun Belt versus Frost Belt on certain, let's say, energy issues, or whatever it may be. You'll find some people voting on some global issues, about how they perceive government, helper, hindrance, et cetera. But those are very subtle, attitudinal kinds of coalitions for the voter to have in mind.

I reject single-issue voting as a big determinant of future elections. Single issues, if they are put under an umbrella of a general view of life — whether it's pro-family, whether it's anti-government, I don't care what it is, anti-regulation — if you can take a number of single issues and put them under an umbrella or some sort of a general thrust, you can have an impact upon the individual that way.

But in terms of a single issue, up or down, in some of these states, it takes a multiple of issues to coalesce voters in a certain direction.

QUESTION: Do you see the Hispanic population in the Sun Belt, especially in California or Texas, being a substantial factor in politics?

MR. TARRANCE: I certainly do. The only trouble is at the moment the Hispanic population, be it northern New Mexico or southeastern New Mexico or Texas or California, right now is in that period of their political life of talking about power, trying to organize about power.

One of the biggest problems we had in the Census Bureau was getting the information the Hispanics needed to legislate, to direct policy, to basically understand what's going on in their own population.

And I remember I was amused when I worked at the Census Bureau that when we talked about Hispanic data, most Census Bureau statisticians thought we were talking about Puerto Ricans in New York City.

So with that in mind, the Mexican American or Hispanic population is probably another 10 years away from really having a major impact. First of all, you've got to get the numbers. A lot of them have to get certified, naturalized, et cetera. Then you have to get the proper leadership. The leadership, in my opinion, is not there yet for the Hispanic population. It's very fractionated. It's still very localized, and you don't have any large leaders. It takes leaders to spark coalitions or spark sort of a thrust for a population subgroup. And thirdly, they tend to be a little bit more conservative, if you use that word loosely, in terms of family and church, and they're not exactly as activist as the people who marched through the state of Mississippi a few years ago.

So there are a number of constraining factors, but in terms of keeping an eye on the Hispanic population, any politician who does not do that and does not keep working toward that is going to lose sight of where the eventual realignment may occur. Keep in mind the way you realign an electorate is not conversion so much, but mobilizing new voters. And the first things the Republicans have done, whether it's Phoenix, whether it's Silicon Valley, whether it's Dallas or Houston, they found out that all these people moving into these new communities were Republican. And I know in the community I moved into in Houston, they didn't even have a Republican chairman or anything out there, and yet there was a tremendous amount of voters. In fact, I looked at the '76 election in the community where I lived, which wasn't there 10 years ago, and it was 87 percent Republican.

So the Republicans have finally found out that particularly southern Republicans have moved from the new country club into the new developments, and from the new developments they've had to move probably into the Hispanic culture.

And as you know, there's great competition between the Democrats and the Republicans. The Democrats are still maximizing largely their black vote, and the Mexican-American vote is up for grabs.

I might say in Texas that the Mexican-American vote has been progressing about five points every election more to the Republican party. It used to be that we were lucky if we saw 12 or 14 points, and then we saw 20 and 25, and it looks like we could be up in the 30s. And any time you divided 100 percent, 30 to 70, you're talking about only a 40 exchange, rather than 90-10 as you see on blacks, where you've got an 80 net exchange, which is pretty devastating.

QUESTION: In 1980 there was a strong effort to run what amounts to a coalition or parliamentary election of members of the House. You were running against Tip O'Neill. You were running against the Democratic majority. How would you characterize the success or failure of that, and how would you project that in the future as a tactic?

MR. TARRANCE: So many candidates, if you look back at the congressional level, lost 53-47, 54-46. In many cases 51-49. If a context or framework for that election can be built to move some ticket-splitters, some independents, into a different behavior, or at least letting them know where the parameters of this election are, antigovernment, antiregulation, whatever it might be for that particular feature of that election and not get totally disintegrated along personality and constituent service, you can effectuate a four, five, six-point change, and believe me, that's all you need for a lot of these congressional seats that are largely interparty competitive within 55-45.

So in that respect, I think it was successful in 1980 to move three or four points. There may be a potential of as much as five or six points to move, depending upon if everything hits right at the right time.

If you look at the World Series, a dropped ball or a misjudgment on base runnings, someone can turn a whole game around. And you go from Yankees to Dodgers almost overnight.

So these contextual campaigns are very, very fragile, and a bad economic report, a bad international incident, or whatever, can really break up that context. But if everything is rolling right like it was in 1980, then you can build a four or five-point margin for a congressional candidate which affects races.

But it's still going to be interpersonal and personality is the key determinant.

QUESTION: To what degree has the apparent movement of Republican voters to the Sun Belt resulted in a more firm, Democratic control in those areas from which the Republican voters came?

MR. TARRANCE: Well, that's a good point. If Paul Weyrich is looking at it, he just wants to know who is coming to Congress next session. He doesn't care whether they got there with 51 percent or 71 percent.

But the point is, most of these districts were carved in redistricting in such a way that the Republicans, let's say, had an habitual 40 percent of the vote. Now maybe they're pulling 30 percent of the vote. They were still losers. It is affecting some of those areas where we had districts that had half suburbs, half something else, and some of those people have moved from suburb to suburb, and usually it's a Cleveland suburb to a Houston suburb, or whatever it may be.

That does impact upon some of those elections, but in terms of the actual result up here on the Hill, I can't see it doing anything more than reinforcing some of those Democratic seats.

QUESTION: What do you see as the one or two key issues that will allow a Conservative to bring over the Democratic vote, the independent vote, in

1982? In other words, notwithstanding the variables of Reaganomics and the like, what two platform planks can we count on, perhaps?

MR. TARRANCE: Well, you've got to understand, roughly, there are two dimensions to assessing an election, one obviously has to do with foreign policy, whether we're perceived strong, weak, embarrassed, not embarrassed, et cetera. The other, of course, is the economic or domestic side.

The key to the congressional Republican running in 1982 will obviously have to be economic. I think once the Reagan Administration is in power and they have more information and are doing certain things on the defense side, it will not be a cutting issue at the CD level, at the local level. I don't believe we've had very much of that ever in our history anyway.

So the cutting issue will be the economy, and it depends on how you look at it. We're fast seeing the old balancing act between inflation or unemployment. Which is more important? Some areas are more devastated than others. Do people believe, in a credibility sense — do they believe that Reagan's program's a little bit more pain — maybe we'll be able to make it.

I notice that the [Republican] Congressional Campaign Committee advertising is "Nobody said it would be easy." This is a way of gaining more time, of looking at what's going to happen to the economy, and I'm sure there are some factors in the economy that Reagan can't control, but I have a sneaking suspicion that there are going to be a lot of fine candidates out there that will be in an election largely not under their control in '82 as opposed to those elections that are very much under control.

MR. WEYRICH: Thank you very much, Lance.

[Applause]